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THE " C L A S H OF CIVILIZATIONS" THESIS:
FINDINGS FROM INTERNATIONAL C R I S E S , 1918-1994.
HEMDA BEN-YEHUDA,
B A R ILAN UNIVERSITY, I S R A E L

1. Introduction

Several approaches to the explanation of conflict, crisis, and war
co-exist in contemporary International Relations (IR) theory. Core
among these are power, territoriality, regimes, ethnicity, and the "clash
of civilizations" (hereafter civilizations) thesis. Power, territoriality,
and regimes explore the specifics of confrontations between and among
states. Although the democratic-peace theory (democracies do not make
war on democracies) stems from a liberal approach, these three theories
accord well with the state-centric world view of the Realist paradigm.
By contrast, ethnicity and civilizations do not accept the Realist outlook. Rather, ethnicity focuses on sub-state elements and on the confrontations that they create within one state (as in Chechnya), or as part
of an inter-state rivalry (e.g. the protracted Arab-Palestinian-Israel conflict). Ethnicity emphasizes the diversity within and between states,
highlighting the fact that states are not unitary actors protected by the
abiding principle of sovereignty. The civilizations approach, the topic of
our study, transcends national boundaries and points to the binding ties
that create much broader grouping than state loyalties.
1

2. The Clash of Civilizations

According to Huntington's definition, civilizations are cultural
entities that involve "values, norms, institutions and modes of thinking
to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance" [Huntington 1996:41]. More specifically, a civilization consists of a "moral milieu encompassing a certain number of
nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole"
[Huntington 1996:41]. Huntington lists several objective attributes that
characterize civilizations: blood, race, religion, language, history, way
of life, customs and institutions. He also points to the crucial subjective
element of self-identification by people. As such, Huntington presents
civilizations as "the biggest 'we' within which we feel culturally at
home as distinguished from all the other 'thems' out there" [Huntington
1996:43], Hence, civilizations are a totality. They have existed in the
past and are most likely to exist and affect certain aspects of world politics in the third millennium.
2
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Conflict, according to the civilizations approach, is expected primarily between different civilizations, and not within a civilization.
This does not mean that conflict does not exist within civilizations but
rather that conflicts of the inter-civilizational type are expected to be the
major ones, the most intense and the extremely dangerous confrontations among states [Huntington 1993a: 48, 1996: 266, 291,312],
What is it in civilizations that produces confrontation? Why should
we expect more conflict between civilizations than within a single civilization? The logic of the Huntington thesis is based upon social-psychology: in-group cohesion is maintained by the existence of conflict
towards an outside group. Diversity leads to a clash of interests and
makes compromise hard to reach. Once the road to collision is set, civilizations also add ready-made coalitions that broaden the scope of hostilities by new actors that join the confrontation and raise the prospects
of escalation [Huntington 2000: 610]. In short, this outlook divides the
world into zones of relative peace within each civilization and zones of
turmoil involving adversaries that belong to different civilizations.
Huntington presented his thesis as a paradigm, not as a social science research program that is supported by a systematic analysis of
empirical data. His examples help explain his ideas and make them
interesting, challenging, persuasive to some and disturbing to others.
However, this lack of supportive evidence reduces the salience of the
"Clash of Civilizations" as a major theoretical approach in IR because
a theory must also contain established regularities, i.e., laws that are
derived from a large body of empirical findings. It is therefore essential
to test the civilizations hypotheses with data on conflict, crisis and war.
A major step in this direction is the Russett, Oneal and Cox study,
though its findings do not support the civilizations thesis. Russett et. al.
assess the relative power of Realist, Liberal and Civilizational variables
in explaining the incidence of militarized interstate disputes observed
annually from 1950 to 1992, focusing on COW (Correlates of War)
dyads. Interstate conflict, in their study, ranges from the exchange of
threats between two states, through a demonstration of force to the actual use of violence [Russett et. al. 2000: 591]. Taking a close look at different propositions derived from the civilizations approach they conclude that contiguity, alliances, relative power, shared democracy and
economic interdependence provide a better account of interstate conflict
than the civilizations hypotheses. More specifically, Russett et. al., find
that:
3
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•
•

Pairs of states split across civilizational boundaries are no
more likely to become engaged in disputes than are other states
[Russett et. al., 2000: 594-595, 597, Oneal and Russett
2000:612],
Among Huntington's eight civilizations, interstate conflict was
significantly less likely only within the West [Russett et. al.,
2000: 596].
As the Cold War waned, interstate conflict became less common not more so, as Huntington claimed [Russett et. al., 2000:
599-600].

In his reply to Russett, Oneal and Cox, Huntington defends the civilizations thesis and explains the discrepancy between his paradigm and
the findings based on the MID (Militarized Interstate Dispute) data
[Huntington 2000: 609-610]. He asserts that the temporal, substantive
and definitional approaches in Russett et. al. do nothing to test, prove or
disprove his thesis. From the temporal standpoint, the Cold War constitutes well over 90% of the period they investigate while the civilizations
approach is designed to characterize the post-1989 period. Second, from
a substantive outlook, the dataset is limited, according to Huntington, to
interstate conflicts alone, which are but a small, and possibly quite
unrepresentative, sample of the violent conflicts in the world. Third,
from a definitional perspective, the core argument of the Clash of
Civilizations deals with the escalation dynamics of inter-civilizational
conflicts as a cause for concern in contemporary global politics.
Henderson and Tucker 2001 also test dyads between 1816-1992, to
assess the relationship between civilization membership and the onset
of war. Their conclusions relate to three distinct periods: 1816-1945:
when states of similar civilizations were more likely to fight each other
than were those of different civilizations (findings that contradict
Huntington's thesis); 1946-1988: when civilization membership was
not significantly associated with the onset of war (as Huntington claims
for the Cold War period); and 1989-1992: when civilization membership was not significantly associated with the onset of war (though
Huntington contends that in this period the clash of civilizations should
be most apparent). These results, the authors claim, challenge
Huntington's claims and seriously undermine the policy recommendations that devolve from his clash of civilizations thesis.
In this study we, too, test the civilizations thesis, this time
focussing on international crises during the 1918-1994 period. In doing
6
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so, we follow the path set forth by Russett et. al., and present findings
from systematic empirical data analysis. Our unit of analysis is the
occurrence of an international crisis, not a pair of states in a militarized
dispute. Using ICB system-level dataset, we focus on a broader timespan before the Cold War, and cover not only militarized disputes, but
all international crises. As such, our analysis also includes interstate
escalation processes that do not involve violence at all.
Taking Huntington's answers into account, we are aware that the
civilizations thesis was designed specifically to characterize conflicts in
the post-Cold War era. However, we maintain that if civilizations are
inherently expected to have an important impact on conflict dynamics,
then this impact must have also expressed itself in past cases. For a theory of civilizations to emerge, it is necessary to test its hypotheses with
data not only on the post-Cold-War years but also as far back as possible in the pre-Cold War era.
To accommodate the argument regarding the unique characteristics
of Cold War and of non-Cold War conflict dynamics, we will distinguish between two groups of crises: those belonging to the protracted
East-West conflict, and all other cases that occurred before, during, and
after the Cold War. We expect that the Cold War cases that were dominated by an ideological struggle will not support the civilizations thesis.
We find it reasonable to expect that, in all other cases that are not subjected primarily to a superpower confrontation at the global level, the
"Clash of Civilizations" approach will be supported and that we will
find diversity in the core crisis attributes that characterize intra- and
inter-civilizational crises.
7

3. Theoretical Framework

This work follows the Russett et. al., study on civilizations and war
and their classification of states into eight civilizations: Western, Latin
American, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, African, Sinic, Buddhist
and Lone States.
We created a new variable: "Type of Civilizational Conflict" with
three values: 1. Intra-civilizational crises (Intra-CC) — crises that occur
within one civilization, that is, a confrontation in which all the adversaries belong to the same civilization group; 2. Inter-civilizational
crises (Inter-CC)—crises that involve adversaries from two or more
civilizations; and 3. Cold War crises—all ICB crisis that belong to the
"East-West" protracted conflict [Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997:3327
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361], A list of these crises is found in the Appendix. This category of
cases is created to test the special attributes of the Cold War — a conflict that, according to Huntington, overshadowed the 20 century and
will be replaced in the 21 ' century by a clash of civilizations.
Amongst the 412 international crises in the ICB dataset, 43% are
intra-CC (n=176), 52% are inter-CC (n=215), and 5% are Cold War
cases (n=21). Following Huntington's thesis, we expect to find unique
crisis attributes for each of these three groups and differences among
them. However, using the ICB dataset, we are able to look not only at
violence and war but also at crisis periods and escalation processes
within them. Hence we focus on three core phases during an international crisis: onset, escalation to violence and outcome. Our research
questions reflect these three phases:
,h

s

•
•
•

Do Cold War, intra-CC, and inter-CC differ in their onset?
Do Cold War, intra-CC, and inter-CC differ regarding
violence?
Do Cold War, intra-CC, and inter-CC differ in their outcome?

The onset of an international crisis focuses on the act that triggers
the crisis and marks the beginning of the escalation process. Using the
ICB variable of trigger, we can distinguish between several types of
crisis onset: 1. political, 2. economic, 3. external change, 4. other: nonviolent, 5. internal challenge to regime, 6. non-violent military, 7. indirect military, and 8. violent act.
Escalation to violence in international crises denotes the extent of
violent hostilities used by the adversaries during the crisis. Unlike the
onset that denotes the opening act, violence is a process that relates to
the entire confrontation. The ICB variable viol designates the highest
level of violence present during the crisis, falling into one of the following categories: 1. no violence, 2. minor clashes, 3. serious clashes,
4. war.
Crisis outcomes specify the way crises end. Using the ICB variable
outfor we identify 1. accommodative outcomes—formal, semi-formal,
and tacit agreements and 2. non-accommodative modes of termination—unilateral acts, imposed agreements, crises that fade over time
and other ICB type terminations.
Following the three research questions presented above, we spell
out the following postulates for our research:
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2003
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PI. The onset of inter-CC will be more violent than that of that of
intra-CC.
P2. The onset of Cold War crises will be less violent than that of
inter-CC.
P3. Violence in inter-CC will be more intense than in intra-CC.
P4. Violence in Cold War crises will be less intense than in interCC.
P5. The outcomes of inter-CC will be less accommodative than
intra-CC.
P6. The outcomes of Cold War crises will be less accommodative
than inter-CC.
These postulates follow the rationale of the civilizations approach
and Huntington's claim regarding the basic difference between the Cold
War era and the post-Cold War years. Actually, for every phase of a crisis, postulates 1, 3, and 5 spell out a more severe "clash" for the interCC (based on their diversity and overarching hatred) than for the intraCC (where common "we-ness"' is assumed to have a moderating
impact).
For Cold War crises, we highlight in postulates 2, 4, and 6 the
expectation for diversity in core crisis attributes between East-West
cases and both inter-CC and intra-CC. We expect that the existence of
rival ideologies will have an impact on the onset, escalation to violence
and on the outcomes of crisis that represent the extent of compromise
reached at the conclusion of the confrontation. Moreover, due to the
danger of global confrontation, we expect that the use of violence in
crises between superpowers will be less intense.

4. Findings

In this study we explore the "civilizations" element as a source of
turmoil in world politics. Findings on the onset of international crises
are summarized in Table 1 below. Some difference between intra-CC
and inter-CC exists in every type of crisis trigger but the largest, most
noticeable and meaningful category is violent act as a mode of crisis initiation: 50% of all intra-CC start with violence while only 37% of the
inter-CC share this trait. Contrary to the Huntington postulate spelled
out in PI, the data point to less extreme onset in the inter-CC than intraCC group. A similar trend is found in the internal challenge to regime
type of onset, though with a much smaller gap: 10% of the intra-CC
begin this way and only 6% of the inter-CC cases.
7
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Table 1 - Onset: Triggers to International Crises
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There is virtually no difference in the frequency of cases with nonviolent military onset: 16% in intra-CC and 15% inter-CC. This, too,
does not accord with the civilizations thesis.
All other types of trigger support the civilizations assertion with
some diversity in attributes between intra-CC and inter-CC and a higher percent for inter-CC: 24% vs. 18% for political triggers, 3% vs. 1 %
for economic acts, 6% vs. 2% for crisis that begin with an external
change, 3% vs. 0% in other- non-violent type acts and 6% vs. 4% in the
indirect military group. Given the small percentages in each category
we refrain from interpreting each individual category but emphasize the
trend: violent onset characterizes intra-CC while less extreme type
onset represent the inter-CC.
Although Huntington's argument regarding the need to differentiate between intra-CC and inter-CC is somewhat supported, his claim—
spelled out in PI—that inter-CC are the most violent confrontations of
all, is rejected. Intra-CC are found to be more extreme in their onset.
Table 1 also includes data on Cold War crises. As Huntington
claims, these crises are significantly different from intra-CC and interCC. While violent acts was the largest type of trigger for both intra-CC
and inter-CC, with 50% and 37% of the cases respectively, only 14% of
the crises in the protracted East-West conflict were initiated by violence. P2 is therefore supported by evidence from international crises.
Actually, for every type of onset, the data prove that Cold War cases are
a distinct group that is triggered by political acts - 38% of the cases, or
external changes that are regarded as an escalation by the adversaries 19% of the cases.
On the whole, data on the onset of crisis manifests that the three
groups of crises differ and that while intra-CC are the most violent in
their onset, Cold War cases are the least violent.
Findings on the escalation to violence in international crises are
presented in Table 2 below. Diversity in intra-CC and inter-CC cases
appears in two levels of violence: war and minor clashes.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2003
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Supporting the civilizations claim, as expressed in postulate 3,
inter-CC war cases are almost double those in the intra-CC group—29%
to 16%. Supporting the same trend, but with a smaller gap between the
two groups of crises, intra-CC escalated via minor clashes in 34% compared to only 23% of the inter-CC cases.
Table 2 - Escalation to Violence in International Crises
Minor
Clashes

None
Type
Intra
civil.
Inter
civil.
Cold
War
Total

War

Serious
Clashes

ToUl

N
40

N
60

34

N
48

%

23

27

N
28

%
16

52

24

50

23

51

24

62

29

13

65

4

20

3

15

1

5

105

%

114

102

91

N%
176
(100%)
215
(100%)
21
(100%)
412

% May not add to 100 due to rounding

It is also interesting to note that in about one fourth (105 of 412) of
all international crises no violence is used at all. This is true with
respect to both intra-CC and inter-CC. Similarly, serious violence—a
level higher than minor clashes, but short of full-scale war— is near
identical for intra-CC and inter-CC and once more characterizes about
a quarter of all cases in each group of crises.
In sum, diversity and similarity between intra-CC and inter-CC
attributes co-exist. Postulate 3 is supported by findings for escalation to
war cases, the most severe category of violence in world politics, as
well as those with minor clashes in both types of crises. However, similar trends in the two groups are found in the cases with no violence or
serious clashes.
Escalation to violence in Cold War cases is significantly different
from both the intra-CC and the inter-CC, as in the onset phase. Strongly
supporting P4 and Huntington's claim regarding the differences
between Cold War confrontations and all other clashes, the largest category of Cold War cases—65%—involves no violence, and a mere 5%
escalate to war. In fact, a descending trend appears: the higher the level
of violence, the smaller the percentage of Cold War crises - 65% of the
cases with no violence, 20% with minor clashes, 15% with serious
clashes and only 5% with full-scale war.
Findings on the outcome of international crisis are provided in
9
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Table 3. Our analysis focuses on accommodative and non-accommodative outcomes for the three groups of crises.
Type
Intra
Civil.
CoM
War
Total

Formal
agreement
N
4)

Table 3 - Outcomes of International Crises
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An unilateral act is the most frequent type of outcome for all international crises: 36% of the intra-CC, 44 % of the inter-CC and 75% of
the Cold War cases. These findings support postulates 5 and 6. As postulate 5 suggests, more inter-CC than intra-CC end in a unilateral/nonaccommodative mode. As postulate 6 argues, Cold War crises appear to
be a class apart - with nearly twice as many unilateral act cases, compared to both intra-CC and inter-CC. With this high proportion of unilateral-type termination, all other outcomes are of marginal importance,
due to the limited number of crises in each one of these groups.
A quite similar trend is evident in imposed agreement outcomes,
but with fewer cases: 10% of the inter-CC and only 6% of the intra-CC
end this way.
Accommodative outcomes comprise formal and semi-formal
agreements, and understandings. The distribution of accommodativetype endings is similar: a near identical percentage of inter-CC and
intra-CC end in formal agreements—21% and 23% respectively, and
12% and 13% of semi-formal agreements as well as 5% and 4% of tacit
understanding.
The "other/faded" type ending involves non-accommodative acts
often carried out by allies of the adversaries and situations where confrontation fades over time because a clear termination does not exist. In
this type the intra-CC group takes the lead with 16% vs. 7% for interCC. It seems reasonable to argue that the harshness of the clash, as postulated in the civilizations thesis, makes it harder for such cases to fade
away over time.

5. Conclusions

Our study presents a first cut of crisis findings on intra-CC and
inter-CC cases as well as Cold War crises. The data point to a clear dis-
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tinction between Cold War crises on one hand and both intra-CC/interCC on the other. This diversity is more striking than that between intraCC and inter-CC for which differences and similarities are found.
More specifically, PI states that an inter-CC will be more violent
than an intra-CC. Our findings lead us to reject this hypothesis. The data
on the onset of crisis confirms that intra-CC are the most violent, intraCC are less so and that Cold War cases are the least violent of all.
P2 expects the onset of Cold War crises to be less violent than that
of inter-CC. This postulate is supported by findings from ICB data on
international crisis. In fact, Cold War cases appear to be a category apart
in all crisis attributes tested in this study.
P3 on violence in crisis contends that inter-CC will be more violent
than intra-CC. As noted earlier, this postulate is supported primarily for
war and minor clashes.
P4 postulates that Cold War will be less intense in escalation to violence than inter-CC. As was the case with onset, so too for violence; the
findings support this postulate on the unique attributes of Cold War confrontations.
P5, on the outcomes of crises, holds that inter-CC will be less
accommodative than intra-CC cases. This postulate is supported by unilateral acts (the most frequent type of crisis termination in all international crises) and imposed agreements.
P6 asserts that the outcomes of Cold War crises will be less accommodative than inter-CC. Once again, as with postulates 2 and 4, this
expectation is supported by ICB findings on international crises.
On the whole, our study supports Huntington's claim on the diversity between Cold War confrontations and other types of rivalry.
However, our research also accords with the Russett et. al., study. The
attributes that characterize intra-CC and inter-CC reveal much less profound differences than we would expect to find if a "Clash of
Civilizations" is regarded as a major driving force for conflict in world
politics. We did find some differences, and the inter-CC cluster is somewhat more severe in some aspects—i.e. escalation to violence; but in
other crisis attributes—i.e. crisis outcome, both types of crises are rather
similar; and in crisis onset intra-CC are actually more violent than inter
CC.
Where do we go from here? Why are the findings partial and weak?
One could conclude that based on these findings, the Clash of
Civilizations thesis does not carry the explanatory power it was
believed to hold. In contrast, it can also be argued that the lack of suphttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol49/iss49/4
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portive results derives from insufficient operational measures of civilizations as a theoretical concept. Given these mixed trends and partial
support for the civilizations thesis derived from ICB findings on crises
as well as from other studies mentioned earlier on enduring rivalries, we
suggest a cautious approach.
Before we dismiss the idea raised by Huntington, future research
should clarify the research question at hand and concentrate on more
data analysis. Theoretically we need to focus on two core aspects: first,
what is a civilization and what are its multifaceted operational characteristics, and second, what are the unique attributes of inter-CC and
intra-CC conflicts? What is the rationale for the differences among
these two types of conflict? Once these conceptual-methodological topics are addressed, it will be necessary to take a fresh look at the empirical evidence. More in-depth comparative inquiries should also follow,
using various databases (MID, ICB, MAR) to generate more reliable
conclusions on civilizational diversity and conflict in world politics.
Appendix
CRISIS
Russian Civil War I
Russian Civil War II
Kars-Ardahan
Turkish Straits
Greek Civil War II
Communism in Hungary
Truman Doctrine
Marshall Plan
Communism in Czechoslovakia
Berlin Blockade
Guatemala
Syria/Turkey Confrontation
Berlin Deadline
Bay of Pigs
Berlin Wall
Cuban Missiles
EC-121 Spy Plane
Cienfuegos Submarine Base
Afghanistan Invasion
Able Archer
Nicaragua MIG-21s
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DATE
1918
1918
1945
1946
1946
1947
1947
1947
1948
1948
1953
1957
1958
1961
1961
1962
1969
1970
1979
1983
1984

ACTORS
Russia
Russia
Turkey
Turkey, USA
Greece
USSR, Hungary,
Greece, Turkey, USA
USSR, Czechoslovakia
USSR, Czechoslovakia
USSR, France, UK, USA
Guatemala, USA, Honduras
Turkey, USA, Syria
France, UK, USA, West Germany,
Cuba, USA
East Germany, USSR, France, UK
USA, Cuba, USSR
USA
USA
USSR, Afghanistan, Pakistan,USA
USSR
USA
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End Notes
1. Power as the core realist variable explaining war in international
relations appears in the classical work of Morgenthau, 1948/1956;
as well as Claude, 1962; Kissinger, 1957; Levy, 1987; and Waltz
1979. Still in the realist domain, studies on territoriality, conflict,
and war include Diehl, 1991; Gleditsch, 1995; Huth, 1996;
Mitchell, and Brandon, 1999; Russett, Oneal, and Cox., 2000; and
Vasquez, 1993, 1995, 1996. The literature on regimes and the
democratic peace, such as Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997:803-819;
Chan, 1997; Gleditsch, 1995; James, Solberg and Wolfson, 2000;
Maoz,1998; and Russett, O'neal, and Cox., 2000; adds liberal theoretical ideas and integrates them into the state-centric explanation of violence and war. By contrast, studies on ethnicity such as
Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997:779-802; Carment and James,
1995, 1997, 1998; Connor, 1994; Forbes, 1997; Gurrand
Moore, 1997; as well as Smith, 1971; investigate the sub-state
domain.
2. See fn. 1 in Russett et. al., 2000: 584.
3. Fox, 2001, tests two civilizations—Islam and the West—but only
with respect to ethnic conflict, thereby reducing the meaning of
civilizations from a broad concept to the more operational term of
ethnic violence using Gurr's MAR3 data. The state level rather
than international foci used in his study, as well as the more narrow—ethnic and not comprehensive—civilizational attributes of
these confrontations, make Fox's findings of limited relevance for
evaluating the controversial "clash of civilizations" thesis.
4. A summary of their findings is presented in Russett et. al.,
2000:602.

5. The Cold War era is a unique period that is not characterized by a
clash of civilizations, according to Huntington. But this classification, actually, requires that we define what we mean by the concept of a civilization. If it encompasses a collective with a common culture, religion, a distinct political system, values, and
norms (as noted on page 2), then the East-West rivalry can indeed
be placed within the context of a civilizational struggle between
two civilizations, but with different crisis behaviours than
Huntington expects for such a clash.
6. Not all crises during the Cold War period were primarily related
to the East-West conflict. Though the Cold War may have exacerbated many regional conflicts, its effects can be traced to both
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol49/iss49/4
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intra-CC and inter-CC clusters, thereby preserving the distinct crisis attributes of each group of cases.
7. Russett et.al., 2000:606-608. These categories follow the maps
that appear in Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, 1996: 22-27;
see also Russett et.al., 2000:591-92. We used identical groupings
so that our findings can later be compared with those from MID
on enduring rivalries.
8. Given the scope of variables involved in this study we refrain
from testing other sources of explanation such as regime, territoriality, and ethnicity. These will be integrated into future research to
supplement this study on the civilizations approach.
9. This finding may seem to contradict the percentages described
previously regarding violent onset of crisis. No real contradiction
exists because the two describe distinct phases in a crisis.
Escalation is not automatic in all phases. A crisis may erupt with
violence and its management may be non-violent (as in the 1952
Catalina affair between Sweden and the USSR, or the 1955 Gaza
raid-Czech arms deal between Egypt and Israel). By contrast, a
crisis may be triggered by a non-violent act but escalate to war (as
in the 1967 Six-Day War case between Israel and its Arab adversaries). Hence the different percentages and trends that characterize violent onset may or may not manifest themselves with follow-up violence in the next escalation to violence phase of the
confrontation.
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